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Citing Counsel’s Opinion about the
Merits of Legal Proceedings in SEC
Filings
By Wendy Gerwick Couture*
I. Introduction
This essay focuses on a narrow issue: whether, and how, issu-
ers should cite counsel’s opinion when expressing opinions about
the merits of legal proceedings in filings with the Securities and
Exchange Commission.
Issuers currently have three general approaches when express-
ing opinions about the merits of legal proceedings:
Approach A: state counsel’s opinion.
Approach B: state the issuer’s opinion with citation to counsel’s
opinion as a basis thereof.
Approach C: state the issuer’s opinion without citation to counsel’s
opinion as a basis thereof.
This essay argues that issuers should choose Approach B.
To reach this recommendation, this essay proceeds in six parts.
Part II identifies the mandatory disclosures that relate to the
merits of legal proceedings. Part III explains how counsel’s
opinion about the merits of legal proceedings informs the
aforementioned disclosures. Part IV provides examples of issuer
disclosures under Approaches A, B, and C. Part V reviews the
SEC staff’s historical treatment of this issue via the review and
comment process. Part VI analyzes three key considerations that
should inform an issuer’s choice among Approaches A, B, and C:
(1) the issuer’s potential securities fraud liability for opinions
about the merits of legal proceedings; (2) the risk of exposing
counsel to private civil securities fraud liability as a primary
violator; and (3) the risk of waiving the attorney-client privilege
and attorney work product protection. Finally, drawing from the
preceding parts, Part VII argues that, when expressing opinions
about the merits of legal proceedings, an issuer should state its
opinion with citation to counsel’s opinion as a basis thereof.
*Wendy Gerwick Couture is a Professor of Law at the University of Idaho
College of Law, where she teaches securities regulation, business associations,
and white collar crime.
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II. Mandatory Disclosures about the Merits of Legal
Proceedings
The underlying merits of legal proceedings are relevant to sev-
eral disclosure obligations.1 The merits directly implicate Item
103 Legal Proceedings disclosures and U.S. GAAP Loss Contin-
gencies disclosures. In addition, the underlying merits of legal
proceedings affect whether they must also be discussed in Item
303 Management Discussion & Analysis (“MD&A”) and Item
503(c) Risk Factors.
Item 103 of Regulation S-K requires issuers to “[d]escribe
briefly any material legal proceedings, other than routine litiga-
tion incidental to the business, to which the registrant or any of
its subsidiaries is a party or of which any of their property is
subject.”2 Item 103 does not require issuers to directly discuss the
merits of particular legal proceedings,3 but the materiality trig-
ger for disclosure necessitates an assessment of the merits of the
proceedings. As explained by the Supreme Court, when analyzing
the materiality of contingent or speculative events, materiality
depends “upon a balancing of both the indicated probability that
the event will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event
in light of the totality of the company activity.”4 As applied to
legal proceedings, the probability of an unfavorable outcome
depends on the underlying merits of the proceedings.5
Second, GAAP requires disclosure of material loss contingen-
cies,6 including certain legal proceedings. In short, a company
must accrue a loss contingency if it is “probable” that a liability
has been incurred and the amount of loss can be reasonably
estimated.7 If necessary for the financial statements not to be
misleading, the company must also disclose the nature of the ac-
crual and, in some circumstances, the amount accrued.8 If the
loss contingency is not accrued, it must nonetheless be disclosed
if there is at least a “reasonable possibility” that a liability has
been incurred.9 Such a disclosure must include both the nature of
the contingency and an “estimate of the possible loss or range of
loss or a statement that such an estimate cannot be made.”10 A
company “may make an assertion that any amount beyond what’s
been accrued is not material to the financial statements.”11 In ad-
dition, the SEC staff permits estimated loss to be aggregated in a
logical manner.12
The GAAP assessments of probability of material loss, reason-
able possibility of material loss, and estimated loss necessarily
depend on the merits of the underlying proceedings.13 In addition,
an issuer’s explanatory footnote about its accounting treatment
of a legal proceeding might need to directly discuss the underly-
ing merits. For example, the Accounting Standards Codification
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includes the following illustrative disclosure with respect to an
accrued loss contingency, which includes an opinion about the
underlying merits:
On March 15, 19X1, Entity B filed a suit against the company claim-
ing patent infringement. While the company believes it has
meritorious defenses against the suit, the ultimate resolution of the
matter, which is expected to occur within one year, could result in a
loss of up to $25 million in excess of the amount accrued.14
Therefore, qualitative disclosures about the underlying merits of
legal proceedings may be required to explain an issuer’s account-
ing treatment of legal proceedings.15
Item 303 of Regulation S-K requires companies to discuss, in
their MD&A, any known trends or any known demands, commit-
ments, events, or uncertainties that are reasonably expected to
have a material impact on results of operations, liquidity, or
capital resources.16 As the SEC reminded issuers in its “Dear
CFO” Sample Letter, legal proceedings potentially implicate this
standard.17 Likewise, Item 503(c) of Regulation S-K requires
disclosure of the most significant factors that make an invest-
ment in an issuer’s securities speculative or risky,18 which could
include legal proceedings. For example, in recent guidance about
cybersecurity disclosures, the SEC reminded issuers that “litiga-
tion, regulatory investigation, and remediation costs associated
with cybersecurity incidents” should be considered when evaluat-
ing the need for cybersecurity risk factor disclosure.19 The
underlying merits of legal proceedings affect whether their
potential impact on the issuer are so great that they must be
disclosed in one or both of these sections.20
These various disclosure requirements do not perfectly overlap,
either with respect to the legal proceedings that must be disclosed
or with respect to the contents of required disclosures. As for the
legal proceedings that must be disclosed, the SEC has created a
helpful table comparing the disclosure triggers under Item 103
and under GAAP.21 The table shows that, depending on the cir-
cumstances, each standard is potentially more expansive than
the other.22 Likewise, the SEC has noted that the MD&A
disclosure requirement may pre-date any accounting recognition
of a loss contingency from a legal proceeding.23 As for the contents
of required disclosures, each required disclosure serves a distinct
purpose.24 Despite these differences, issuers often incorporate
their litigation loss contingency disclosures by reference into
their Item 103 disclosures.25 Notably, as part of the SEC’s
Disclosure Effectiveness Initiative, the SEC has requested com-
ment on the potential merging of Item 103 and legal proceeding-
related loss contingency disclosures into a unified standard.26
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III. Counsel’s Opinions about the Merits of Legal
Proceedings Inform Issuers’ Disclosures
Unsurprisingly, litigation counsel’s opinions about the merits of
legal proceedings inform issuers’ disclosures about those
proceedings. Indeed, if an issuer expressed a legal opinion without
consulting counsel, the opinion could be misleadingly incomplete
because “[i]n the context of the securities market, an investor,
though recognizing that legal opinions can prove wrong in the
end, still likely expects such an assertion to rest on some
meaningful legal inquiry.”27 Similarly, if an issuer expressed a
legal opinion that diverged from counsel’s opinion, without
disclosing that divergence to investors, it could potentially give
rise to omissions liability because a reasonable investor would
expect an issuer to base its legal opinions, at least partially, on
the opinions of counsel.28
For example, when preparing Item 103 Legal Proceedings
disclosures, an issuer’s disclosure counsel should request status
updates from litigation counsel and prepare a proceedings
report.29 Then, based on the status of each legal proceeding,
disclosure counsel should determine whether disclosure is
required and, if so, the content thereof.30
Litigation counsel’s opinions are also taken into account when
preparing loss contingency disclosures. First, litigation counsel
might provide information about legal proceedings directly to the
issuer to aid in the preparation of loss contingency disclosures.31
Second, the issuer’s auditor typically solicits information from lit-
igation counsel via a letter of audit inquiry.32 Indeed, according to
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board standards, “[a] let-
ter of audit inquiry to the client’s lawyer is the auditor’s primary
means of obtaining corroboration of the information furnished by
management concerning litigation, claims, and assessments.”33
Counsel’s responsive disclosure of confidential information to an
auditor—who is a third party—risks waiving the attorney-client
privilege and attorney work product protection.34 As such, counsel
should limit the response to the parameters outlined in the 1975
American Bar Association Statement of Policy Regarding
Lawyers’ Responses to Auditors’ Requests for Information. Under
the ABA Statement of Policy, counsel “should normally refrain
from expressing judgments as to outcome except in those
relatively few clear cases where it appears to the lawyer that an
unfavorable outcome is either ‘probable’ or ‘remote’.”35 In addi-
tion, “it is appropriate for the lawyer to provide an estimate of
the amount or range of potential loss (if the outcome should be
unfavorable) only if he believes that the probability of inaccuracy
of the estimate or range of potential loss is slight.”36 Counsel’s
compliance with the ABA Statement of Policy should serve as
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“the basis for the auditor not probing further (into counsel’s liti-
gation analysis) in its audit.”37
IV. Differing Approaches to Citing Counsel’s Opinion
about the Merits of Legal Proceedings
Although issuers rely on counsel’s opinion when drafting
disclosures about the merits of legal proceedings, they differ with
respect to whether, and how, to cite counsel’s opinion in the
disclosures themselves. Most issuer disclosures about the merits
of legal proceedings follow one of three approaches:
Approach A: state counsel’s opinion.
Approach B: state the issuer’s opinion with citation to counsel’s
opinion as a basis thereof.
Approach C: state the issuer’s opinion without citation to counsel’s
opinion as a basis thereof.
Examples of each approach follow.
(a). Statement of Counsel’s Opinion
As an example of a disclosure under Approach A, Colgate-
Palmolive Company, in the Legal Proceedings and Loss Contin-
gency disclosures contained in its Form 10-K filed in 2016, stated
counsel’s opinion about the merits of allegations in a specific
legal proceeding:
The Company is a defendant in a lawsuit pending in Utah federal
court brought by N8 Medical, Inc. (“N8 Medical”), Brigham Young
University (“BYU”) and N8 Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“N8 Pharma”)
(collectively, “plaintiffs”). . . . In the third quarter of 2015, plaintiffs
completed a submission of documents in the litigation alleging dam-
ages of approximately $2,500 million. The Company and its legal
counsel believe these damages allegations are without merit and
are vigorously challenging them and defending this case on its
merits.38
As another example, Altria Group Inc., in the Risk Factors and
Loss Contingency disclosures contained in its Form 10-K filed in
2016, stated counsel’s opinion about the merits of legal proceed-
ings overall:
Altria Group, Inc. and its subsidiaries have achieved substantial
success in managing litigation. Nevertheless, litigation is subject to
uncertainty, and significant challenges remain. It is possible that
the consolidated results of operations, cash flows or financial posi-
tion of Altria Group, Inc., or the businesses of one or more of its
subsidiaries, could be materially adversely affected in a particular
fiscal quarter or fiscal year by an unfavorable outcome or settle-
ment of certain pending litigation. Altria Group, Inc. and each of its
subsidiaries named as a defendant believe, and each has been so
advised by counsel handling the respective cases, that it has valid
defenses to the litigation pending against it, as well as valid bases
for appeal of adverse verdicts. Each of the companies has defended,
and will continue to defend, vigorously against litigation
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challenges.39
As a third example, Brownie’s Marine Group, Inc., in the Legal
Proceedings and Loss Contingency disclosures contained in its
10-K filed in 2016, stated its insurer’s counsel’s opinion about
whether a legal proceeding implicated applicable disclosure
requirements:
As previously disclosed, we are co-defendants under an action filed
by an individual in June 2013 in the Circuit Court of Broward
County claiming personal injury resulting from use of a Brownie’s
Third Lung. Plaintiff has claimed damages in excess of $1,000,000.
The insurance carrier’s legal counsel indicates unfavorable outcome
is possible, but not probable. We believe such claim is without merit
and intend to continue to aggressively defend such action.40
(b). Statement of Issuer’s Opinion With Citation to
Counsel’s Opinion as a Basis Thereof
As an example of a disclosure under Approach B, CME Group
Inc., in the Legal Proceedings and the Loss Contingency disclo-
sures contained in its Form 10-K filed in 2016, expressed an
opinion about the merits of a specific legal proceeding with cita-
tion to counsel’s opinion as a basis thereof:
In 2008, Fifth Market, Inc. (Fifth Market) filed a complaint against
CME Group and CME in the Delaware District Court seeking a
permanent injunction against CME’s Globex system and unquanti-
fied enhanced damages for what the plaintiff alleges is willful in-
fringement of two patents, in addition to costs, expenses and at-
torneys’ fees . . . Based on its investigation to date and advice from
legal counsel, the company believes this suit is without merit and
continues to defend itself vigorously against these charges.41
As another example, Community Trust Bancorp Inc., in the
Legal Proceedings and Loss Contingency disclosures contained in
its Form 10-K filed in 2018, expressed a general opinion about
the merits of legal proceedings overall with citation to counsel’s
opinion as a basis thereof.
CTBI and subsidiaries, and from time to time, our officers, are
named defendants in legal actions arising from ordinary business
activities. Management, after consultation with legal counsel,
believes any pending actions are without merit or that the ultimate
liability, if any, will not materially affect our consolidated financial
position or results of operations.42
As a third example, First Niagara Financial Group, Inc., in the
Loss Contingency disclosures contained in its Form 10-K filed in
2016, expressed an opinion about whether legal proceedings
implicated applicable disclosure requirements with citation to
counsel’s opinion as a basis thereof.
In the ordinary course of our business there are various threatened
and pending legal proceedings against us. Based on our review and
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consultation with our outside legal counsel, we believe that the
aggregate liability, if any, arising from such litigation would not
have a material adverse effect on our Consolidated Financial State-
ments at December 31, 2015.43
(c). Statement of Issuer’s Opinion Without Citation to
Counsel’s Opinion as a Basis Thereof
As an example of a disclosure under Approach C, Vitamin
Shoppe, Inc., in the Legal Proceedings and Loss Contingency
disclosures contained in its Form 10-K filed in 2018, expressed
an opinion about the merits of a specific legal proceeding without
citing counsel’s opinion as a basis thereof:
In addition, on or about August 22, 2017, a federal securities class
action suit was filed in the United States District Court in the
District of New Jersey against Vitamin Shoppe and certain officers
and directors on behalf of purchasers of Vitamin Shoppe common
stock between March 1, 2017 and August 6, 2017 . . . We believe
this lawsuit is without merit, and we are vigorously defending the
lawsuit.44
As another example, Twilio Inc., in the Risk Factors, Legal
Proceedings, and Loss Contingency disclosures contained in its
Form 10-K filed in 2018, expressed a general opinion about the
merits of legal proceedings overall without citing counsel’s
opinion as a basis thereof.
We intend to vigorously defend ourselves against these lawsuits
and believe we have meritorious defenses to each matter in which
we are a defendant.45
As a third example, Apple Inc., in the Legal Proceedings and
Loss Contingency disclosures contained in its 10-K filed in 2017,
expressed a general opinion about whether legal proceedings
implicated applicable disclosure requirements without citing
counsel’s opinion as a basis thereof.
In the opinion of management, there was not at least a reasonable
possibility the Company may have incurred a material loss, or a
material loss in excess of a recorded accrual, with respect to loss
contingencies for asserted legal and other claims. However, the
outcome of litigation is inherently uncertain. Therefore, although
management considers the likelihood of such an outcome to be
remote, if one or more of these legal matters were resolved against
the Company in a reporting period for amounts in excess of
management’s expectations, the Company’s consolidated financial
statements for that reporting period could be materially adversely
affected.46
V. SEC Staff’s Historical Treatment of Opinions about
the Merits of Legal Proceedings
The SEC staff, via the review and comment process, has not
frequently discussed the degree to which issuers should, or should
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not, cite counsel’s opinions when expressing opinions about the
merits of legal proceedings. The staff’s historical treatment of
this issue, however, is rather surprising.
On multiple occasions in the mid-2000s,47 with the most recent
example occurring in 2008,48 the SEC staff expressed the view
that issuers are not qualified to express opinions about the merits
of legal proceedings because they are legal conclusions. The SEC
staff’s proposed remedy was usually expressed in the alternative:
(1) omit the merits opinion (to the extent the opinion was volun-
tarily disclosed); or (2) name the counsel on whose expertise the
issuer was relying (and, to the extent required, obtain counsel’s
consent to be named as an expert therein).
For example, in 2006, reviewing iPayment Inc.’s Form S-4
registration statement, the SEC staff made the following com-
ment about the issuer’s Legal Proceedings disclosures:
We note that in many of the proceedings listed you state that the
claims “are without merit” or that the company believes it has
“meritorious defenses” to the claims asserted. These statements are
legal conclusions that the company is not qualified to make. If they
are based on the advice from litigation counsel, please state this,
identify counsel and include a consent from counsel. Otherwise,
please remove these statements.49
In response, iPayment removed these opinions from its Legal
Proceedings disclosures but retained them in its Loss Contingency
disclosures.50
As another example, in 2007, reviewing Smith International
Inc.’s Form 10-K, which was incorporated by reference into a
Form S-8 registration statement,51 the SEC staff made the follow-
ing comment about the issuer’s Loss Contingency disclosures:
We note that management relies upon the opinion of legal counsel
in making judgments regarding whether a loss is probable and can
be reasonably estimated to determine if an accrual is necessary.
Please review the disclosure to name the external legal advisors
relied upon and provide their consent as an expert. Refer to Section
7(a) of the Securities Act of 1933.52
Smith International responded by replacing the phrase “the
opinion of outside legal counsel” with the phrase “discussions
with outside legal counsel” in future filings.53
The SEC staff’s position on this issue appears to have evolved
since 2008, however.54 Indeed, as discussed above in Part IV, issu-
ers routinely cite the opinions of counsel as a basis for opinions
about the merits of legal proceedings, without naming counsel; in
addition, issuers routinely express their own opinions about the
merits of legal proceedings without citing counsel’s opinion as a
basis thereof. Since 2008, SEC staff comments, rather than focus-
ing on the propriety of issuers’ expressions of merits opinions,
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with or without citation to counsel, have instead requested that
issuers explain the basis for opinions about the merits of legal
proceedings, particularly Loss Contingency disclosures.55
In addition, even in the mid-2000s, it was unclear whether the
SEC staff took the same position with respect to periodic reports
as the one taken for registration statements. Although one such
comment was made with respect to a Form 10-K that was not
incorporated by reference into a registration statement,56 the
remainder of staff comments of this ilk arose during the review of
registration statements or periodic filings incorporated therein.
On the one hand, because registration statements and periodic
reports use integrated disclosure standards57 and because the
SEC requires experts to be named in both types of filings,58 these
comment letters were arguably instructive with respect to
periodic reports. On the other hand, because the Securities Act
explicitly requires the consent of experts while the Exchange Act
does not,59 perhaps the SEC staff differentiated between the two
types of filings.
In sum, although these historical SEC staff comments are
rather surprising, it is unlikely that SEC staff continues to take
this position, particularly in the context of periodic reporting.
Therefore, this essay proceeds by identifying the other counter-
vailing considerations that might affect issuers’ decisions about
whether, and how, to cite counsel’s opinion when expressing
opinions about the merits of legal proceedings.
VI. Considerations Affecting the Citation of Counsel’s
Opinion about the Merits of Legal Proceedings
When an issuer is deciding whether, and how, to cite counsel’s
opinion when expressing opinions about the merits of legal
proceedings, three key considerations come into play: (1) the issu-
er’s potential securities fraud liability for materially misleading
disclosures; (2) the attorney’s potential securities fraud liability
for materially misleading opinions; and (3) the risk of waiver of
the attorney-client privilege and attorney work product
protection. These considerations should affect issuers when choos-
ing among Approaches A, B, and C (described above in Part IV).
(a). Issuer’s Potential Securities Fraud Liability for
Materially Misleading Disclosures
The first consideration potentially affecting whether, and how,
an issuer should cite counsel’s opinion when expressing an
opinion about the merits of legal proceedings is the degree to
which such citation might affect the issuer’s potential liability for
securities fraud.
Issuers face potential securities fraud liability for materially
misleading opinions, including opinions about the merits of legal
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proceedings.60 Indeed, merits opinions are similar to legal compli-
ance opinions, which have been the subject of high-profile
litigation.61 As recently clarified by the Supreme Court in Omni-
care, Inc. v. Laborers District Council Construction Industry Pen-
sion Fund, opinions are potentially actionable under two liability
pathways (assuming the other elements of the claim are also
satisfied): (1) an opinion is actionable as an untrue statement of
material fact only if the opinion was disbelieved by the speaker;
and (2) an opinion can give rise to omissions liability to the extent
the issuer fails to disclose a fact showing that the company lacked
the basis for expressing the opinion that a reasonable investor
would expect.62 Although Omnicare addressed liability under § 11
for alleged misrepresentations in registration statements, its rea-
soning likely applies equally to liability under § 10(b) and Rule
10b-5, at least to the extent these claims are premised on
disclosures in SEC filings.63
The safe harbor for forward-looking statements potentially
protects issuers from liability for some opinions about the merits
of legal proceedings, assuming the statements are accompanied
by meaningful cautionary language.64 This protection is not
complete, however. First, the safe harbor does not apply to state-
ments that are “included in a financial statement prepared in ac-
cordance with generally accepted accounting principles.”65 Second,
the applicability of the safe harbor to present-tense opinions
about the merits of legal proceedings is not certain.66 Finally, the
safe harbor does not apply in SEC enforcement actions.67
Most relevant to this essay, an issuer’s citation to counsel’s
opinion as a basis for the issuer’s opinion about the merits of
legal proceedings could lessen the issuer’s liability risk under
Omnicare’s second liability pathway. (This assumes, of course,
that the expressed merits opinion is consistent with counsel’s
opinion.) As explained by the Supreme Court, in order for an
opinion to give rise to omissions liability, the issuer must omit
“particular (and material) facts going to the basis for the issuer’s
opinion—facts about the inquiry the issuer did or did not conduct
or the knowledge it did or did not have—whose omission makes
the opinion statement at issue misleading to a reasonable person
reading the statement fairly and in context.”68 If an issuer
discloses the basis for its opinion, it undercuts the argument that
a reasonable person would have understood the opinion to rest on
additional undisclosed bases that were not, in fact, present. In
other words, as the Supreme Court stated, “to avoid exposure for
omissions . . ., an issuer need only divulge an opinion’s basis.”69
Therefore, one potential way for an issuer to insulate an
opinion about the merits of legal proceedings from omissions li-
ability is to state the basis for the opinion, which would include
SECURITIES REGULATION LAW JOURNAL
126 © 2018 Thomson Reuters E Securities Regulation Law Journal E Summer 2018
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3241035 
the opinion of counsel. In other words, the potential for securities
fraud liability should incentive issuers to choose Approaches A or
B (which include a citation to counsel’s opinion) rather than Ap-
proach C (which does not).
(b). Attorney’s Potential Securities Fraud Liability for
Materially Misleading Opinions
A second consideration potentially affecting whether, and how,
an issuer should cite counsel’s opinion when expressing an
opinion about the merits of legal proceedings is the degree to
which such citation might expose counsel to securities fraud
liability.
The SEC has broad enforcement authority against an attorney
who engages in fraudulent conduct.70 Although there is not a
private right of action for aiding and abetting securities fraud,71
the SEC can pursue attorneys as aiders and abettors.72 In addi-
tion, if an attorney provides an auditor with inaccurate or
misleading legal analysis, the attorney could be liable for violat-
ing SEC Rule 13b2-2(b)’s prohibition on directly or indirectly tak-
ing “any action to coerce, manipulate, mislead, or fraudulently
influence any independent public or certified public accountant
engaged in the performance of an audit . . . of the financial state-
ments . . . that are required to be filed with the Commission.”73
An issuer’s decision whether, or how, to cite counsel’s opinion in
an SEC filing is unlikely to affect an attorney’s liability in an
SEC enforcement action because an attorney’s behind-the-scenes
fraudulent conduct, regardless of whether counsel’s role is
disclosed to investors, can expose the attorney to liability.
Most relevant to this essay is the question of whether the cita-
tion of counsel’s opinion in an SEC filing could potentially subject
the attorney to private civil liability as a primary violator. Only
the person who “makes” a fraudulent statement is subject to
private liability for securities fraud.74
As the Supreme Court held in Janus Capital Group v. First De-
rivative Traders, the “maker of a statement is the person or entity
with ultimate authority over the statement, including its content
and whether and how to communicate it.”75 The Court stated that
“[a]ttribution within a statement or implicit from surrounding
circumstances is strong evidence that statement was made by—
and only by—the party to whom it is attributed.”76 Further, the
Court, explaining how its ruling in Janus was consistent with its
prior decision in Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.,77 noted that it is relevant whether the
public could have relied on the defendant’s deception.78 Applying
this interpretation of “maker,” the Court held that an investment
advisor was not a primary violator where the investment advisor
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did not file the allegedly deceptive prospectuses with the SEC,
“[n]or did anything on the face of the prospectuses indicate that
any statements therein came from [the investment advisor]
rather than [the issuer].”79
Applying Janus to issuers’ opinions about the merits of legal
proceedings, disclosures under Approaches B and C would not
subject counsel to potential liability as a primary violator. Under
Approach C, counsel’s opinion is not even referenced, and thus
counsel’s role as akin to a mere drafter, who is not within the
scope of liability under Janus.80 Under Approach B, although the
issuer cites counsel’s opinion as a basis for the issuer’s opinion,
the disclosure does not “attribute” the opinion to counsel; the at-
torney does not have “ultimate authority” over the issuer’s
expressed opinion; and the public would not rely on the attorney’s
undisclosed opinion.81
Disclosures under Approach A, however, might expose counsel
to primary liability under Janus.82 Under this approach, the
disclosure actually states counsel’s opinion. As the Court noted in
Janus, attribution is strong evidence that the statement was
made by the person to whom it is attributed.83 Moreover, an is-
suer should not include a statement of counsel’s opinion in an
SEC filing without the attorney’s consent,84 and thus counsel
arguably has “ultimate authority” over the statement.85 Further,
unlike the defendants’ undisclosed deceptive acts in Stoneridge,
the public could rely on counsel’s opinion itself because it is
disclosed.86 Finally, although issuers choosing Approach A do not
usually name the counsel whose opinion is stated, counsel of rec-
ord in legal proceedings is publicly available information.
Therefore, the risk that an attorney might be exposed to private
civil securities fraud liability as a primary violator should
incentivize issuers (and their counsel) to choose Approaches B or
C rather than Approach A when expressing opinions about the
merits of legal proceedings.
(c). Risk of Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege and
Attorney Work Product Protection
A third consideration potentially affecting whether, and how,
an issuer should cite counsel’s opinion when expressing an
opinion about the merits of legal proceedings is the risk of waiv-
ing the attorney-client privilege or attorney work product
protection.
The attorney-client privilege protects confidential communica-
tions between the client and the attorney made for the purpose
or obtaining or providing legal advice.87 The attorney work prod-
uct protection protects an attorney’s “written statements, private
memoranda and personal recollections”88 prepared in anticipation
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of litigation or for trial, with heightened protection afforded to
work product revealing an attorney’s mental processes.89
Both of these protections can be waived by disclosure. The
attorney-client privilege is waived if the client voluntarily
discloses the confidential communication to a third party.90 The
attorney work product protection is waived if the protected
materials are voluntarily shared with an adversary.91
The scope of waiver is potentially broader than the information
disclosed, especially with respect to the attorney-client privilege.
It is possible that the waiver of the attorney-client privilege could
extend to other materials relating to the same subject matter.92
The risk of waiving the attorney-client privilege and attorney
work product protection has been widely discussed in the context
of an attorney’s response to audit request letters.93 Indeed, as
discussed above in Part III, concerns about waiver underlie the
ABA Statement of Policy Regarding Lawyers’ Responses to Audi-
tors’ Requests for Information.94 These same concerns apply to
the disclosure of counsel’s opinion about the merits of legal
proceedings in SEC filings.
Issuers who choose Approaches B and C when expressing
opinions about the merits of legal proceedings do not risk waiv-
ing the attorney-client privilege or attorney work product
protection. Under neither approach is counsel’s communication or
counsel’s work product actually disclosed. Merely citing counsel’s
opinion as a basis for the issuer’s opinion is not akin to citing the
advice of counsel as an affirmative defense in litigation, which
risks waiver.95
Issuers who choose Approach A, however, risk waiving the
attorney-client privilege and attorney work product protection.
Counsel’s opinion about the merits of legal proceedings is both a
confidential attorney-client communication96 and attorney work
product revealing the attorney’s mental processes.97 If an issuer
discloses counsel’s opinion about the merits of a legal proceeding
in a public SEC filing, that likely constitutes disclosure to a third
party (thus waiving the attorney-client privilege) and disclosure
to an opposing party (thus waiving the work product protection).
In light of potentially broad scope of these waivers, issuers
should choose Approaches B or C rather than Approach A when
expressing opinions about the merits of legal proceedings.
VII. Conclusion
Balancing the considerations discussed in Part VI, issuers
should choose Approach B when expressing opinions about the
merits of legal proceedings in SEC filings: an issuer should state
the issuer’s opinion with citation to counsel’s opinion as a basis
thereof. Under this approach, the issuer potentially insulates
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itself from omissions liability under Omnicare by disclosing the
basis for its opinion about the merits of legal proceedings; the
disclosure would not expose the attorney to potential civil securi-
ties fraud liability as a “maker” under Janus; and the disclosure
would not risk waiving the attorney-client privilege or attorney
work product protection. This recommendation assumes that, as
discussed above in Part V, the SEC staff does not object to this
disclosure choice during the review and comment process.
A remaining open policy question is whether Approach B is the
optimal disclosure decision in light of the goals of securities
disclosure.98 If not, the SEC could revise the disclosure rules
discussed above in Part II to mandate a different form of
disclosure, the SEC staff could adopt a different disclosure policy
pursuant to the review and comment process discussed above in
part V, or the competing considerations discussed above in Part
VI could be adjusted to incentivize issuers to choose a different
approach. In the meantime, however, when expressing opinions
about the merits of legal proceedings in SEC filings, issuers
should cite counsel’s opinion as a basis thereof.
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